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Executive summary 
This is the final and comparative report summarizing the findings 
from the three field reports that have constituted the project Contextu-
alizing peacebuilding activities to local circumstances. This project 
was conducted as a comparative study of UN local-level peacebuild-
ing in three countries – Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan.  
 
When initiating this study, the research team chose the Civil Affairs 
section of UN peacekeeping operations as an entry point. The Civil 
Affairs section seems especially pertinent as it is a section which is 
usually deployed wherever a peacekeeping mission has established 
presences, and is tasked, inter alia, with acting as an intermediary be-
tween local authorities and populations, as well as with the rest of the 
UN peacekeeping mission and other UN actors.1 The data underlying 
this report were generated during four weeks of fieldwork in each 
country, between August and November 2011. In addition to observa-
tions, surveys and focus groups the research team conducted a total of 
195 extended interviews. It is our hope that the findings presented 
here will be both interesting and useful for academics, practitioners 
and policymakers alike.  
 
As regards the academic field, it may be noted that our findings op-
pose the traditional critique of liberal peacebuilding, which has argued 
that poor delivery and slow implementation are propelled by a West-
ern rationality that dominates the peacebuilding efforts of the interna-
tional community, seeking to apply standardized liberal peacebuilding 
solutions in supporting countries emerging from conflict and focusing 
mostly on the national level. For practitioners and policymakers in the 
UN and member states, our aim has been to raise awareness of the im-
portance of local-level peacebuilding, and to indicate some challenges 
and innovations related to this aspect. From our fieldwork, we have 
seen how peacebuilders put a premium on understanding the local po-
litical dynamics, recognizing themselves as part of the political 
‘game’. The peacebuilders we spoke with were very aware that their 
projects and other forms of support, while formulated as part of a lib-
eral peacebuilding agenda, could be useful tools to build relationships 
and advance their agenda.  
                                                 
1  Civil Affairs is the UN component most consistently present in the field in UN peace-
keeping operations. It is one of the largest civilian components in UN peacekeeping, with 
more than 1000 staff members deployed globally to facilitate the implementation of 
peacekeeping mandates at the subnational level. CA officers frequently act as space-
makers for other actors to fulfil their roles and peacebuilding activities. 
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The project has found that UN components to some degree do contex-
tualize their peacebuilding activities to local circumstances, especially 
as regards the subnational level. Our consultations included govern-
ment officials, but also traditional officials and other members of the 
local population. The local level of the UN has been strengthened 
through organizational innovations, and field offices provide an insti-
tutionalized infrastructure for contextualizing peacebuilding to local 
circumstances.  
 
For development specialists and practitioners in the field this will 
come as no surprise. Friction between the actors in the field is bound 
to be a continuing feature of peacebuilding and support to post-
conflict reconstruction. Thus, rather than concentrating on tensions 
and turf battles, we have chosen to focus on connections between the 
actors in the field. Friction and tension is not necessarily a negative 
feature, because it can spark innovative and contextualized approaches 
to peacebuilding.  
 
However, we also found considerable room for improvement. Despite 
good intentions, multilateral support and projects often tend to be 
poorly coordinated, internally and with other international and nation-
al actors, and at times in direct competition: this creates duplication, 
low implementation rates and ultimately results in suboptimal outputs 
and impact. In the individual case studies and policy briefs, we have 
included specific recommendations to policymakers in the missions as 
well as the UN Secretariat and member states.  
 
 
‘Some things in Liberia are quite different and it just doesn’t work 
based on international best practices. That’s where we assist our 
international partners with providing context.’2 
  
 
 
1. Introduction
3
 
This project has investigated how the United Nations is undertaking 
local-level peacebuilding. Our entry point has been the Civil Affairs 
(CA) section of the UN’s DPKO, currently is one of the fastest grow-
ing civilian components of peacekeeping. The project has used this 
entry point to see how various missions implement their mandates and 
contextualize international guidelines to national and local circum-
stances. Further attention has focused on how UN peacekeeping or-
ganizes its activities on the local level and working together with local 
authorities, other UN agencies and development actors. 
 
UN peacekeeping operations have not only expanded their scope dur-
ing the past decade, taking on various substantive tasks, but have also 
extended their reach to all corners of the countries where they are de-
ployed. In these locales, UN Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) are most 
frequently deployed, providing the UN with a presence on the local 
level. They are part and parcel of the efforts of the UN and the host 
state to establish security and the delivery of core services. The ra-
tionale for making the connection between Civil Affairs and local-
level peacebuilding is grounded in the evolving understanding that 
‘peacekeepers are peacebuilders’4 and should implement early peace-
building tasks.5  
 
Fieldwork was conducted in Haiti (United Nations Stabilization Mis-
sion in Haiti – MINUSTAH), Liberia (United Nations Mission in Li-
beria – UNMIL) and South Sudan (United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan – UNMISS). While the empirical focus of this report is on the 
                                                 
2  National CA officer, Monrovia. 
3  This report is based on fieldwork in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan, carried out together 
with Diana Felix da Costa and Hannah Neumann. The report draws on the reports from 
the fieldwork and inputs from Diana Felix da Costa and Hannah Neumann. The project 
‘Contextualizing peacebuilding activities to local circumstances’ has been funded by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
4  United Nations 2012. Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of United Nations Peace-
keeping to Early Peacebuilding: Strategy. UN DPKO and DFS, New York: p.10.   
5  As defined by the Secretary-General in his opening remarks of the Security Council dis-
cussion on peacebuilding, 13 October 2010 (UN 2010), where he stressed that peacekeep-
ing missions should be enabled ‘to have an impact as “early peacebuilders”’. The meeting 
in the Security Council was held to discuss the latest Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (UN 2010). 
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role of CA, it will frame these within the wider UN engagement in 
local-level peacebuilding in the three countries. The overall objective 
has been to examine how the activities of these actors are contextual-
ized to local circumstances. In a UN peacekeeping context, the CA 
section, as the component most consistently present in the field, is of-
ten set to perform the very challenging job of serving as intermediary 
for all these actors. CAOs act as the intermediaries between the local 
population and local government, and the mission itself, frequently 
acting as space-makers for other actors to assume their roles, includ-
ing peacebuilding activities.6  
 
Through our field studies, we witnessed a will among external actors 
to analyse and understand the local political economy and reflexivity 
on their own role in this political economy. We also put the spotlight 
on various strategies employed to further peacebuilding goals through 
the use of assets such as helicopters and other infrastructure, devel-
opment of small-scale projects to increase buy-in of the larger peace-
building agenda, and so forth. In our view, the current challenges for 
the UN to adapt its peacebuilding to local needs are not caused by 
some ‘blind spot’ as to the role as external providers of material and 
ideational resources, but by conflicting power structures and cumber-
some processes which stem from the complexities of the field and are 
inherent in the peacebuilding project as such. Through our fieldwork, 
we identified several vital components and activities in the UN appa-
ratus designed specifically in order to contextualize these activities. 
However both the coordination aspect of the support together with 
other development actors, and the technical expertise of the CAOs 
were described as rather ad hoc and in need of improvement. Going 
back and forth between rural areas and capitals in Liberia, Haiti and 
South Sudan enabled the research teams to trace this focus in three 
different countries from the field where the work was being imple-
mented, to mission HQs where bureaucratic concerns often dominated 
the agenda.    
 
                                                 
6  For policy documents on the role of UN DPKO on the local level, see e.g. United Nations 
(2008), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (‘The Cap-
stone Doctrine’) Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York: United Nations. 
Available at: 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.p
df; and United Nations DPKO (2008), Policy Directive: Civil Affairs, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations; and Department of Field Support April 2008. Available at: 
http://www.undg.org/docs/8915/Civil-Affairs-Policy.pdf; UN (2008).  
2. Background 
Rather than searching for tensions between the global and the local, 
our focus seeks to show how processes pertaining to peacebuilding are 
connected. Within this perspective, local people in host countries are 
not regarded as helpless victims, or solely as actors of resistance: they 
are actors who play an active role in global processes, establishing 
global connections through everyday practices in post-conflict envi-
ronments. The CAOs deployed in the field have the potential to play 
an important role in facilitating these connections. The CA section has 
evolved in parallel with the increasingly multi-dimensional character 
of peacekeeping and the need for the international community to en-
gage with intra-state conflicts. Its activities and purposes emerged ra-
ther inductively as a response to the needs on the ground in the Bal-
kans and elsewhere during the 1990s. In that period, increasingly 
complex civilian tasks in a wide range of various kinds of missions 
became a more substantial part of the UN’s agenda than during the 
Cold War. The establishment of the CA section reflects both a shift 
away from traditional peacekeeping, but also the wide range of quali-
tatively different civilian tasks with which the UN has been gradually 
mandated. This inductive, or bottom–up, way of becoming a DPKO 
section characterizes what may be the distinguishing feature of CA 
today: its potential to respond flexibly to many and diverse needs in 
totally different places and settings. The component is designed to 
function throughout the various mission phases, and the evolving 
needs of mandate implementation. As such, it is meant to be able to 
constantly adjust and adapt its activities, in line with shifts in the sur-
roundings and the situation changes, but also in relation to the capaci-
ty and presence of other international partners at the local level. 
 
Propelled by the events and activities in the 1990s, the UN system 
recognized in the early years of the new millennium the greater need 
for governance assistance in order to build a more substantial peace in 
post-conflict countries. Soon several organizational initiatives that 
sought to address these challenges had been taken within the UN sys-
tem. CA support to the host countries was increasingly emphasized by 
the missions themselves (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi) and 
evolved ‘… to the point where “support to the restoration and exten-
sion of state authority” was officially articulated, in 2008, as one of 
the three core roles of Civil Affairs.’7  
                                                 
7 UN Lessons Learned Review on support to Core Public Administration Functions in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict. New York. (2012, at p. 18)   
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According to the Civil Affairs policy directive of 2008, its officers are 
deployed to facilitate the implementation of peacekeeping mandates at 
the subnational level. The policy outlines three main roles for CAOs 
in the field: 
 
 cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level; 
 confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation; 
and 
 support to the restoration and extension of state authority.8  
 
These roles of course depend on the mandate and the stage of mandate 
implementation, but the importance of the CA component in the field 
is increasingly being recognized, mandated and utilized. This has re-
sulted in the ‘...integration of the technical capacities of UNDP and 
political and operational capacities of DPKO in several countries’.9 
Such joint programmes have achieved success in restarting local gov-
ernment functions. These programmes have focused on re-establishing 
local functions, and involve a substantial local component.  
 
By contrast, the academic literature that criticizes the international 
community for being post-colonial, orientalistic and stuck in a West-
ern rationality when deploying to a post-conflict country10 rarely takes 
account of these components, designed specifically for adaptation to 
local needs and political realities, especially at the subnational level. A 
recent overview by UN’s DPKO mapped the nationalities of what al-
most 1000 UN CAOs deployed to the field: the bulk of these officers 
were found to be African (see Figure 1).11 Furthermore the number of 
national staff employed by Civil Affairs in the various UN missions is 
very close to the number of international staff in 2012 (see Figure 2).  
Although critics fail to acknowledge who the actors working for these 
organizations are and where they are coming from, Figures 1 and 2 
here show that emphasis on local participation has largely been im-
plemented within the CA section.  
 
                                                 
8  UN, Policy Directive: Civil Affairs, April 1, 2008. New York: United Nations Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008: p. 3. 
9  UN Lessons Learned Review on support to Core Public Administration Functions in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. (2012, at p. 20) New York. 
10  Philippa Atkinson, ‘Liberal interventionism in Liberia: Towards a tentatively just ap-
proach?’ Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 1, 2008, pp.15-45; Ole Sending, ‘Why 
peacebuilders fail to secure ownership and be sensitive to context’, NUPI Working Paper 
Series 761. Oslo: NUPI, 2009. 
11  UN DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Sections’ statistics (January 2012). By August 
2012 the number of CAOs deployed to the field had risen to over one thousand officers 
deployed in 17 field missions.  
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In his article ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Roland Paris points out 
‘(…) the emergence of what might be called a “hyper-critical” school 
(...) who view liberal peacebuilding as fundamentally destructive or 
illegitimate. (...) that the post-conflict operations of the past two dec-
ades have done more harm than good. Others go further, portraying 
these operations as a form of Western or liberal imperialism that seeks 
to exploit or subjugate the societies hosting the missions’.12 Paradoxi-
cally, the critics he is referring to here seem to be stuck in a certain 
kind of rationality themselves: an academic tradition representing a 
paradigm that does not allow for the consideration of components that 
are designed with the purpose of adapting efforts to local circumstanc-
es.  
                                                 
12  Roland Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding,’ Review of International Studies 36, no. 2, 
2010, at p.2. 
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In general, empirical research on post-conflict countries has not been 
able to integrate the heterogeneity of international organizations with 
a focus on the subnational level. This gap is only slowly being filled. 
The UN components present at the subnational level that are designed 
to engage with local actors and deal with local conflict – such as the 
UN’s CA section – are underrepresented in the literature, which too 
often is dominated by a perspective which somewhat simplistically 
lumps all international actors together under the term ‘peacebuilders’, 
without acknowledging the substantial pluralism of mandates and 
modes of interaction with local authorities and populations.  Research 
has tended to centre on national policies and the capital regions, ignor-
ing efforts on the lower, subnational levels.13 By examining parts of 
UN peacebuilding/peacekeeping that as yet have received little atten-
tion, this report seeks to add heterogeneity perspectives to the litera-
ture.  
   
                                                 
13  See e.g. Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the 
Failure of International Peacebuilding, in the series Failure of International 
Peacebuilding, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (No. 115) (New York: 
Barnard College, Columbia University, 2010); Hannah Neumann, 2011. ‘Taking a micro-
social perspective of impact of peacebuilding interventions on rural citizens: case study of 
a Liberian community’, Peace, Conflict & Development 18 (December 2011): 47–67. 
http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/4%20Iss%2018%20Art%2028%20Final.pdf. 
Accessed August 12, 2012. 
3. Methodology 
This report is based on four weeks of fieldwork in each of the three 
countries, between August and November 2011. In total, the research 
team conducted 195 extended interviews. The research teams were 
composed of John Karlsrud, Niels Nagelhus Schia, Diana Felix da 
Costa and Hannah Neumann. In each country, national researchers 
accompanied the research teams – Saah N'Tow from John Snow In-
corporated and Felesu Swaray from the Kofi Annan Institute at the 
University of Monrovia in Liberia; Gabrielle Hyacinthe from the Na-
tional Democratic Institute in Haiti; and Philip Ohuyoro from the Uni-
versity of Juba in South Sudan.   
 
The approach and methodology used throughout the research were 
anthropologically informed and qualitative. In addition to participant 
observation and interviews, the research team held informal discus-
sions with UN Civil Affairs officers (CAOs), other substantive sec-
tions within the missions, UNDP staff, national-level government, lo-
cal government and civil society organizations (CSOs). Focus-group 
discussions were also carried out in local markets, on university cam-
puses and among rural villagers. Discussions aimed at outlining key 
experiences and challenges of UN’s local-level peacebuilding, includ-
ing strategies to contextualize the mandate. A broad range of people 
was interviewed in order to better develop a robust perspective on the 
UN’s local-level peacebuilding. Discussions and conversations with a 
wide array of members of the local population gave us access to local 
expectations and understandings of the UN missions in general and 
CA more specifically. To further supplement this data, individual case 
studies were also explored. 
3a) Challenges in methodology 
The study offers some useful insights and reflections of the UN’s lo-
cal-level peacebuilding work in Liberia, Haiti and South Sudan, from 
the perspective of CA officers as well as local actors. However, it is 
not intended as a comprehensive account of UN efforts in local-level 
peacebuilding, nor of CA work in the three countries – not least given 
the highly localized nature of local conflict dynamics and responses.  
While we enjoyed the great support and hospitality with the CA sec-
tions, we also made deliberate accounts to include local voices in our 
research. In each of the field visits we interviewed local state authori-
ties and key partners of CA among civil society. The national re-
searchers travelled independently and spoke with local religious lead-
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ers, elders and representatives of civil society groups. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to find many women in relevant local government 
positions and thus there is an overwhelmingly male voice throughout 
this research. Whenever possible, the team made an effort to speak 
with women, in order to add female voices. 
4. ‘Look closer!’ – local peacebuilding 
in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan 
During our fieldwork in the three countries, we recognized that kudos 
and metis among the peacebuilders are connected to the ability to ‘un-
derstand’ the situation: the complex political game continuously 
played out between peacebuilders, the national government, politi-
cians and the elite.14 This is also a common theme on the local level. 
Peacebuilders constitute a heterogeneous group and are difficult to 
generalize, but most of them recognize that they operate in a political 
marketplace15 where patrimonialism often lies firm beneath the veneer 
of a liberal state under construction.16 
 
In Liberia, for example, organizational innovations in 2008 strength-
ened the decentralization of the mission and coordination between the 
mission, UNDP and the UN Country Team (UNCT).17 In preparing 
for the exit of UNMIL, the country was in 2011/2012 strengthening 
the decentralization and coordination activities initiated in the rural 
areas by the UN. In collaboration with UNDP Liberia, they were es-
tablishing regional hubs throughout the country in order to enhance 
and contextualize the regional justice and security as well as infra-
structure.18 In Haiti, we saw that peacebuilders often functioned as 
guarantors and facilitators when local officials wanted to communi-
cate their needs to the ministries in Port-au-Prince. In South Sudan, 
the UN was embarking on an ambitious plan to set up presences 
across the country that are to function as a portal and a platform for 
humanitarian and development efforts by UN actors, Government of 
South Sudan (GoSS) local officials, humanitarian actors and NGOs.  
 
The increasing activity of the UN at the local level warrants further 
attention. Our observations indicate that in UN local-level peacebuild-
                                                 
14  ‘Broadly understood, metis represents a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelli-
gence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment. [...] The 
emphasis is both on [...] ability to adapt successfully to a constantly shifting situation and 
on [...] capacity to understand, and hence outwit [...] adversaries.’ (James Scott (1998) 
‘Seeing like a state’ page: 313. Yale University, )  
15  Alex De Waal, ‘Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace,’ 
International Affairs 85, no. 1, 2009, pp.99–113. 
16  Ole Jacob Sending makes a similar point in his new book, The Field of Peace Building: 
Archimedes in Africa, Oslo: NUPI, forthcoming. 
17  See Neumann and Nagelhus Schia: Contextualizing Peacebuilding to local circumstances 
– Liberian case-study field report. Oslo, NUPI. 48 pages. Security in Practice 6 · 2012 
18  In 2011/2012 local NGOs with experience in awareness raising on human rights and rule 
of law issues at the community level was employed in order to sensitize communities on 
the concept of the hub, its facilities, relevance and how the people could access the ser-
vices. 
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ing, particularly through the activities of the CAOs, there seems to be 
awareness of the complex political economies in which they are situ-
ated. We also repeatedly found evidence of considerable independ-
ence on the local level. Our findings from the three countries we visit-
ed suggest ways on how local peacebuilding can contribute to 
strengthening lines of communication between rural areas and central 
government, but also by helping to facilitate and re-start other funda-
mental societal functions. In order to provide a basis for such func-
tions, these activities may prove especially important in the early 
phases of the peacebuilding process. However there are challenges 
related to this, especially regarding the risk of creating dependency. 
Later in the report we will see how peace committees in one of the 
counties in Liberia got ‘kick-started’. The very fact that Civil Affairs 
does not have very much money may help building local ownership 
and avoiding the dependency trap. In Liberia – currently in a transition 
phase where substantial attention and efforts focus on the need for the 
state apparatus to be able to maintain its activities and functions also 
at the local level – awareness of this aspect ranks high on the agenda.
5 a) Engaging with local actors – formal and traditional au-
thorities, civil society 
In Haiti, MINUSTAH had over 100 CAOs deployed across the coun-
try’s ten departments. In Liberia, CA had 75 officers distributed across 
the country’s 15 counties; and in South Sudan the number was set to 
increase from 100 to about 140 officers deployed during 2012. The 
CAOs encounter different challenges in their different host countries, 
but they all work on a daily basis with national, departmental and lo-
cal-level officials. Through the CA section, the UN missions have a 
reach throughout the host countries that is not matched by any other 
UN agency or NGO. In the words of a CAO in MINUSTAH, civil af-
fairs ‘can feel the temperature on the ground’.19 This impression was 
further strengthened by similar expressions encountered in the two 
other case studies. In Liberia, for instance, the CA section was repeat-
edly characterized as ‘the eyes and ears of the mission at the subna-
tional level’.20 In many instances, the day-to-day interactions between 
CA and local authorities, and the ability of CA to channel needs and 
concerns of local authorities to national levels, have led to close rela-
tions and trust being established between the parties.  
 
However, CA tends to engage more with local government authorities 
than with other non-state actors. This is a challenge that was acknowl-
edged by several of the CA officers we met. It could result in a dis-
torted picture of the challenges on the ground as CA tends to relay the 
challenges as local officials portrayed them.
21
 Among civil society 
organizations (CSOs) there was also a similar problem of representa-
tion. They might claim to be representative of the local communities 
and various causes, but were often perceived by CA as having been 
set up merely to respond to the availability of Quick-Impact Projects 
(QIPs) and other funding.22 Mapping in one region in Haiti indicated 
that there were many such community-based organizations, but they 
were very small and recently established.23 Organizations in rural are-
as were seen as less supply-driven than those in urban areas. Churches 
were seen as heading initiatives that were perceived as enjoying great-
er legitimacy among the population.
24
 Some of our CA interlocutors 
also felt it more important to engage with political parties on the local 
level than with CSOs.  
                                                 
19  Interview with CAO Port au Prince, Haiti. 
20  This expression was repeatedly used by CAOs in Monrovia and the counties in referring 
to their role within the mission. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Felix da Costa and Karlsrud, UN Local . Peacebuilding and Transition in Haiti. Oslo, 
NUPI. 51 pages. Security in Practice 4 · 2012 
23  Ibid. 
24  Neumann and Schia, Contextualizing Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances - 
Liberian Case-study Field Report. 
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Also in South Sudan there is a danger of overemphasizing the efforts 
on the extension of state authority, which is part of the mandate of the 
mission, and not acknowledging that UN peacebuilders may also be 
involved in the authority struggle between traditional and informal 
chiefs on the local level, and newly appointed administrators. While 
the appointment of local officials should be seen as a step towards 
providing an accountable presence of the government on local levels 
that can provide security and basic services, such appointments can 
also be viewed as part of a patrimonial system where the victors share 
the spoils with loyal soldiers who have fought for independence.  
 
Liberia is in a later phase of the peacebuilding process than Haiti and 
South Sudan and has started to implement the draw-down phase. Here, 
representatives from CSO umbrella organizations voiced concern with 
regard to the exit of the mission. They feared that, if support of CA 
was discontinued, the CSOs would be able to survive only with con-
tinuous international support. Without support, most CSOs are likely 
to decrease drastically, and it will be nearly impossible to establish 
new organizations. This concern may be taken to indicate either that 
not enough work has been done to establish a robust civil society 
community throughout the country, or that the mission has created a 
culture of dependency amongst the civil society groups in the country.  
Thus the challenges facing CA when engaging with civil society and 
other local actors are many and complex. Common problems are the 
pervasive lack of capacity, supply-driven orientation of activities, lack 
of broad engagement with non-state actors, lack of community owner-
ship of local CSOs and their activities, and the risk of creating a cul-
ture of dependence. 
5 b) Advancing liberal ideas? 
Most peacebuilding programmes aim for the same goals – to deal with 
the key drivers of conflict, change the conflict dynamics, and prevent 
the use of violence as a means of tackling political, social and eco-
nomic problems and injustices.25 ‘Conflict sensitivity’ refers to the 
ability of an organization to:  
 
a) understand the context in which it is operating, b) understand the interaction 
between the intervention and that context, and c) act upon that understanding, in 
order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict.26  
 
                                                 
25  Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas, 2009. A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensi-
tivity and Peacebuilding. Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, CDA Collaborative Learn-
ing Project. Cambridge, Massachusetts USA.  
26  See International Alert et al., 2004. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, human-
itarian assistance and peacebuilding: a resource Pack. London: International Alert 
(available at www.conflictsensitivity.org). 
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According to Christopher Clapham, peacekeepers understand them-
selves as people who bring ‘solutions’ to the table, while the 
‘peacekepts’ look at international intervention as resources that can be 
‘(…) used by one or more of the internal parties to the conflict, in or-
der to improve their own position within the conflict itself’.27 Clap-
ham further argues that the understanding of what purpose peacekeep-
ing serves and for whom differs significantly between elites of fragile 
states and UN peacekeepers:  
 
Domestic combatants have a clearer and longer-term view of what they are try-
ing to achieve; they are uncluttered – or uninhibited – by the value system within 
which the peacekeepers are operating; they are often very well aware of the do-
mestic and international constraints on the behaviour of the peacekeepers, while 
suffering from few such constraints themselves; and they have a far better grasp 
of the local political scene.
28
 
 
In their concept of the ‘peacebuilding contract’, Barnett and Zürcher 
emphasize the divergent understanding of the goals, and, perhaps most 
importantly, who the benefactors of peacebuilding are.
29
 Peacebuild-
ers ‘want to implement reforms that lead to a liberal peace’,30 whereas 
local elites ‘want to preserve their political power and ensure that the 
peace implementation process either enhances or does not harm their 
political and economic interests’.31  
 
From our fieldwork we would agree with this understanding, but 
would also argue that peacebuilders utilize the material and ideational 
resources that they provide in a conscious manner to advance their 
peacebuilding goals.32 One national CAO in South Sudan told us that 
lack of funding presented a problem for them.33 To gain access and 
leverage with their peacebuilding agenda 
 
they [local officials] need to see something concrete. Now UNDP came on the 
ground with money, so it’s all about UNDP, they have money, forget all about 
                                                 
27  Christopher Clapham, ‘Being Peacekept,’ in Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Oliver Furley 
and Roy May, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, at p. 306. 
28I bid. p.308. 
29  Michael Barnett and Christopher Zürcher, ‘The peacebuilder’s contract: how external 
statebuilding reinforces weak statehood,’ in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting 
the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds), 
New York: Routledge, 2009. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
32  See the country-specific reports from the project ‘Contextualizing peacebuilding activities 
to local circumstances’ (John Karlsrud and Niels Nagelhus Schia 2012) 
http://www.nupi.no/Virksomheten/Avdelinger/Avdeling-for-sikkerhet-og-
konflikthaandtering/Prosjekter/Contextualizing-peacebuilding-activities-to-local-
circumstances   
33  This argument was first developed together with Diana Felix da Costa and presented as a 
paper at the Annual International Studies Convention in San Diego, 2012. See Diana Felix 
da Costa and John Karlsrud, Liberal Peacebuilding Navigating Hybrid Political Orders: 
Local Peacebuilding in South Sudan. Paper presented at the annual ISA convention, San 
Diego 1–4 April 2012. 
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Civil Affairs! Anyway, it’s not a competition but we feel vulnerable, how can we 
convince the government, if we can’t provide anything concrete?34  
 
But the lack of funding could also be turned into an advantage, as the 
following case-study on the development of county peace committees 
in Liberia will show.   
 
Avoiding dependency – how Lofa county was kick-started 
Civil Affairs doesn’t have money. Civil Affairs has knowledge. Civil Affairs has 
contacts and it is present. That’s what we are offering to the authorities and to 
other UN partners.35  
 
In an interview with one of the UN staff in Monrovia we were told a 
story about how the UN helped villagers ‘kick-starting’ Lofa, a rural 
county in the north of the country on the border to Guinea, by facilitat-
ing a process which eventually resulted in the establishment of a coun-
ty based peace committee. In 2007, Lofa county became a pilot for a 
new UN project in Liberia when the HQ in New York mandated 
UNMIL’s Civil Affairs section to carry out 30 county consultative fo-
rums throughout the country. However, CA was not allocated a budget 
or any extra resources for this task: the sole funding the CA officers 
could ask for was for covering water and food expenses. On the other 
hand, only CA officers (CAOs) saw the actual budget. The water and 
food costs were kept low, to allocate more of this budget to transporta-
tion, crucial for the implementation and attendance to the meetings.  
 
CAOs thus bent the rules in order to provide a platform which gave 
people in the county an opportunity to express their concerns: ‘there 
was a great need for this, you could tell that people had not previously 
been listened to’, said an interviewee in Monrovia, September 2011. 
Several other international and national interviewees also followed up 
this view. While this could be seen as an example of ‘organised hy-
pocrisy’ and divergence between plan and action, we would argue it is 
a positive one, where working-level officers circumvent or bend rules 
and regulations to achieve an end result beneficial to the overall man-
date of the mission.36 
 
On the ground the mandate was translated into practical arrange-
ments. Due to the scant budget and resources the facilitator role of the 
Civil Affairs became especially prominent. When CAOs first arrived, 
the villagers would meet them with a whole range of demands: ‘we 
want UNMIL to do a,b,c,d…’. Hearing these requests the CAOs 
                                                 
34 Interview with National CAO, Torit Eastern Equatoria State. 
35 Interview with International CAO, Monrovia.  
36  Nils Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy – Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organi-
zations. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2002.  
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would reply that they had no resources and could only provide trans-
portation. Our interviewee had pressed the villagers even further, ask-
ing at one of the meetings of the county consultative forums: 
  
what do you do if UNMIL leaves tomorrow and you are all on your own? Yes, 
we are strangers, we will leave, PAKBAT [UNMIL’s Pakistani battalion] will 
leave and you will be left on your own, what do you do? Is there something you 
can do before this happens?37  
 
The villagers then suggested setting up peace committees. That 
marked the beginning of a project which now has resulted in well-
established peace committees in all the 15 counties of Liberia, corre-
sponding with the district commissions and working with the political 
districts. These peace committees serve as focal points, and are called 
upon to mediate on a range of issues such as land disputes, ethnic and 
religious tensions and gender-based violence. Through the CA section 
in Lofa the UN had played the role of facilitator. The mandate had in-
deed been produced at UN HQ in New York, but allowing adaptation 
resulted in an interpretation and contextualization of the mandate so 
that it could fit with the local circumstances. 
 
The UN’s peacekeeping missions have limited means of providing 
funding for concrete projects, as they are generally limited to support-
ing capacity development through the numerous substantive officers 
they have on board in areas like reform of the judiciary and security 
sector, and human rights. Missions do have quick-impact projects 
(QIPs), limited to $25,000 or sometimes $100,000, as was the case in 
both South Sudan and Haiti. QIPS are small-scale and time-
consuming and may ultimately lead to less effort being expended on 
conflict prevention, reporting and other mandated tasks. Thus, a chal-
lenge related to an extended use of QIPs is that they may distract the 
officers from their primary function. On the other hand, QIPs are used 
explicitly to improve the mission’s standing on the national, state and 
county levels. The project funds are small compared to those of other 
international actors such as the World Bank, but their advantage is that 
they can be allocated to single projects in one area, and do not have to 
be spread throughout the entire country.  
 
In addition, UN peacekeeping has access to significant logistical re-
sources that can be used to bring government officials to remote areas, 
establish the presence of national authorities and facilitate national 
dialogue and conflict resolution on the local level. In most missions, 
UN Civil Affairs maintains a gatekeeping function for mission flights: 
it can approve/reject proposed candidates put forward by local offi-
cials, other sections within the UN peacekeeping mission, and the UN 
                                                 
37Interviewee, Monrovia, September 2011. 
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agencies, funds and programmes. Although this meant allotting sub-
stantial amounts of time to processing travel requests, some of the UN 
officers also saw the potential leverage that this could give them.  
 
The examples given here all come from the ‘UN family’, but through 
our informal discussions with other international actors, it was clear 
that they also were very aware that their projects, while formulated as 
part of implementing the mandate, could also serve as useful material 
and ideational resources to local elites. Resource capture was 
acknowledged as part of the game by our interlocutors, who generally 
had a clear understanding that they provided material resources and 
legitimacy to the partners they would support in a particular activity.  
5 c) Everyday frictions in peacebuilding 
However, when we move from the micro-level and a focus on the CA 
section to a more macro-perspective on multilateral support as such, 
projects can often seem poorly attuned to local needs. Furthermore it 
is clear that they in many cases are badly coordinated with other inter-
national and national actors; at times they are in direct competition, 
creating duplication, low implementations rates and ultimately result-
ing in suboptimal outputs and impact.38  
 
The field of peacebuilding is particularly exposed to these dangers, as 
the concept is frequently defined and understood differently, depend-
ing on which actor you ask, even within the UN. There is still signifi-
cant resistance to expanding the mandate of peacekeeping operations 
to take on peacebuilding tasks. On the other hand, in the past ten 
years, peacekeepers have effectively become peacebuilders, and there 
is now firm guidance from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon un-
derscoring this point.39 Still, aside from the QIP funds, peacekeepers 
do not have funds included in their budgets for project implementation 
– a point much lamented. In practice, many staff members manage to 
circumvent this problem, making the most of the scant funds at their 
disposal. The availability of mission flights and other logistical means 
should not be underemphasized either, as these resources give signifi-
cant leverage to the substantive activities, in addition to the political 
leverage that the UN mission and its SRSG enjoys, representing the 
UN Secretary-General and the Security Council on the ground.  
 
The government, other UN actors, multilaterals, bilateral donors and 
NGOs are to a certain degree dependent on the logistical and other 
resources that the UN mission has available. In our view, instead of 
                                                 
38  See for instance: de Carvalho and Nagelhus Schia, (2009) Nobody Gets Justice Here! 
NUPI-working paper: 761. 25 pages.  
39  UN, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate after-
math of conflict; and UN, Peace: Keep it. Build it: p.10.   
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competition, this could serve as a fruitful basis for a symbiotic rela-
tionship between these actors. Enabling UN missions to use part of 
their funds towards substantive projects should thus be carefully con-
sidered, so as not to create the seeds of further competition and dupli-
cation among external actors.  
 
However, when we consider the complexity of the peacebuilding pro-
ject, with the interface of the many different agendas, actors and cos-
mologies, it becomes clear that this is a field where friction is bound 
to be a continuing feature. From our findings, we would argue that this 
is not a negative feature, but rather a productive one that can spark 
creativity and innovative approaches between international and na-
tional actors, as was the case with the county peace committees in Li-
beria.  
County Support Bases in South Sudan 
UNMISS is planning to set up 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) in the 
ten states of South Sudan, from 2011 to 2013. According to Hilde 
Johnson, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 
and head of UNMISS, these will serve as ‘a platform and a portal for 
local authorities’,40 as well as for humanitarian, development and 
peacebuilding actors, to extend state authority and deliver services to 
the local population. The CSBs are building on the experience of the 
field offices, the County Support Teams (CSTs) and the Head of Field 
offices (HoFOs) in Liberia,41 and seek to promote efforts aimed at 
providing presences that can be used by all national and international 
actors at the subnational level.   
 
These County Support Bases carry a great promise to the local popula-
tion, a promise that the mission would be wise to heed. Unless their 
presence can be paralleled with service delivery and can result in real 
peace dividends for local populations, the result may be anger and loss 
of confidence in peacekeepers and local authorities alike. The CSBs 
will thus be a prism through which to follow and measure how well 
the international community and the government in Juba are managing 
to instil the trust and confidence needed to achieve ‘real’ peacebuild-
ing from the ground up in South Sudan. While all actors should have 
sober expectations as to what the UN can realistically be expected to 
achieve with only a few CSBs in a country the size of France, the 
CSBs will clearly be an initiative that merits continued and careful 
scrutiny by the international and research communities alike, as a po-
tential example of the UN providing a platform for cooperation be-
tween national and international actors. 
                                                 
40  Interview with Hilde Johnson, SRSG UNMISS, Juba, October 2011. 
41  See Neumann and Nagelhus Schia, 2012, Contextualizing Peacebuilding to Local Cir-
cumstances: Liberian Case-study Field Report (pp. 40–41). 
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In post-conflict countries, government institutions usually face a ca-
pacity challenge, and tend to import international consultants.42 Many 
of our interviewees mentioned the need for international actors to con-
tinue their collaboration with local stakeholders also after the consul-
tations processes have ended. Furthermore, many informants high-
lighted the importance of giving clear feedback to those who are being 
consulted, especially as to whether their suggestions are possible or 
not. Follow-up processes on major consultations also seem important, 
especially with regard to local perceptions of the international pres-
ence.  
 
It is true that local ownership in countries hosting a peacekeeping mis-
sion is being challenged by the substantial international presence, re-
quirements and standards. All the same, we could see from the cases 
in Liberia, Haiti and South Sudan that policy and mandates (or peace-
building activities) are often interpreted and manipulated (or contextu-
alized) at the subnational level in order to fit with the practicalities and 
needs on the ground.  
 
 
                                                 
42  See for instance Benjamin de Carvalho and Niels Nagelhus Schia, 2011, ‘Local and na-
tional ownership in post-conflict Liberia – Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?’ NUPI 
Working Paper 787, Security in Practice 3. Oslo: NUPI. 
6. Conclusions 
The literature to date has focused on the role of resource capture and 
elites. How peacebuilders interact on the local level is still significant-
ly under-researched. From our fieldwork, we have seen how peace-
builders put a premium on understanding the local political dynamics, 
and how they recognize that they themselves are part of the political 
‘game’. We would thus argue that there is a need for a more nuanced 
view of the interaction between external actors, local elites and other 
stakeholders. According to Piccolino and Karlsrud,  
 
[i]n Africa, local elites’ and weak governments’ resistance and manipulation of 
international peacebuilding should be seen as fitting in the longue durée dynam-
ics of insertion in the international system. Although evidently weak, post-
independence African states have been able not only to survive, but often also to 
resist to the countless and – at least on paper – very intrusive forms of economic 
and political conditionality applied on them in the course of the last decades.43 
 
From on our fieldwork, we would argue that many peacebuilders are 
more cognisant of the material and ideational resources involved, and 
are willing to use these to leverage liberal goals. Joining O.J. Sending, 
we would argue that 
  
By omission or commission, students of peace building thus tend to equate the 
financial and military resources of peace builders with the power to shape out-
comes. Because of the privileging of peace builders’ behavior to explain out-
comes there is a related tendency to read unity and homogeneity into the behav-
ior of peace builders.44 
 
There is clearly a symbiotic relationship between peacebuilders and 
national elites, and this is being replicated at the local level. The ac-
ceptance of the liberal agenda that peacebuilders are imposing is bal-
anced with the ability to capture resources. This is the supra-level fric-
tion between international and national actors, but below this, there 
are various more nuanced friction-sites – between international actors 
and between national actors, and in the interaction between these.   
 
When scholars such as Autesserre criticize ‘liberal peace’ as a West-
ern concept unable to adapt to local circumstances,45 these writers 
may well have fallen victim to the same kind of worldview they are 
                                                 
43  Giulia Piccolino and John Karlsrud, ‘Withering consent, but mutual dependency: UN 
peace operations and African assertiveness’, Conflict, Security and Development, 11:4, at 
p.451. 
44  Sending, The Field of Peace Building: Archimedes in Africa: p.5. 
45  Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.  
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trying to criticize in the first place. As shown in this report, the inter-
national personnel we interviewed were very much aware of the im-
portance of local efforts and the need to build peace on national foun-
dations in order to effect successful transitions. Our fieldwork was 
conducted both at the central level in the capitals as well as in rural 
and semi-rural areas of the countries we visited. The divergences be-
tween these different levels revealed that it is far more difficult to con-
textualize peacebuilding activities at the national level than at the sub-
national level. As this report has shown, there are indeed sections, 
programmes and agencies within the UN family that are actively try-
ing to contextualize peacebuilding activities at the subnational level.  
 
The supporting role of the missions, the many contextualized pro-
grammes we identified and the high level of awareness of the need to 
build on local forces among the UN staff we interviewed – all these 
constitute findings that oppose the traditional critique of liberal peace-
building. The scholars who have put forward such critiques argue that 
it is the specific rationality of the international community’s peace-
building efforts, basically manifested in a one size fits all solution, that 
is the reason for poor delivery and ultimately failure of peace opera-
tions. However, several peace operations are indeed succeeding. In the 
course of the first decade of the 2000s, peace had been achieved in 
many areas where the UN had been involved, as in Bosnia, Burundi, 
Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and Timor Leste.46 
Furthermore, our three-nation fieldwork has shown that not only Civil 
Affairs but also other components in the UN are making important 
efforts to contextualize peacebuilding activities to local circumstances, 
especially at the subnational level 
 
                                                 
46  See Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after 
Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
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